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Abstract
This paper analyses the relation between firms’ productivity and the different
modes of participation to international trade. In particular, we account for the
possibility that firms can not only export their products, but also internationally
source their inputs, either directly or indirectly. Using a cross section of firm-
level data for several advanced and developing economies, the study confirms the
productivity-sorting prediction according to which domestic firms are less efficient
than those resorting to an export intermediary, while the latter are less productive
than producers which export directly. We show that the same sorting exists also on
the import side. Finally, we investigate the effects of source country characteristics
on the sorting of firms into different modes of international trade.
Keywords: heterogeneous firms, international trade, direct and indirect exports, direct
and indirect imports, intermediation
JEL codes: F14, D22, L22
1 Introduction
The last two decades witnessed a booming expansion in disaggregated data source which
enabled to disclose a great deal of differences among firms, even within the same sector.
In this scenario, the international trade literature was one of the first to reap the benefits
associated to increased data availability so that new theoretical models were put forth
and a whole new set of empirical facts was established concerning the differences between
exporters and non exporters. The emergence of such firm level heterogeneities, while
important per se, also proved to have relevant implications for aggregate outcomes and
for policy design (see, among the others, Melitz; 2003; Bernard et al.; 2007).
It is in this scenario that an emerging stream of research, within international trade,
has shown the existence of several categories of firms engaged, under different manners,
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in exporting activities. Such categories comprise manufacturing firms that produce the
goods and also directly manage the exchange with the downstream customer abroad,
producers that indirectly reach the destination market through intermediaries and in-
termediaries themselves (Bernard et al.; 2010b; Ahn et al.; 2011; Antra`s and Costinot;
2011).1
The contribution of the paper to this stream of literature is twofold. First, we in-
vestigate which firm’s characteristics are related to different modes of access to foreign
markets, both on the import and export side. While works on exports are quite numer-
ous, much less attention has been devoted to imports. This is unfortunate, given the
strong interconnection between importing and exporting and the key role of imports in
the global economy. As a matter of fact, around 20 per cent of total exports are due
to intermediate inputs being used for further processing (Hummels et al.; 2001). To our
knowledge, it is the first time that it is possible to provide evidence on productivity sort-
ing both for direct and indirect importers. Second, we study how the sorting of firms into
direct or indirect trade is related to that part of fixed costs that is specific to the source
country. Following Davies and Jeppesen (forthcoming) we investigate whether trade bar-
riers lower the differences between direct and indirect traders, again both from the export
and import side.
To do this we resort to survey data by the World Bank (BEEPS) which provide, for
several countries, information about the different modes of export and import. We com-
plement this firm-level data with information on country-level fixed costs. The evidence
suggests that producers in the middle range of size and efficiency are the most likely to
export indirectly through an intermediary, while those firms that are highly productive
and big can manage to export directly. We show that a sorting mechanism similar to
that observed on the export side is found also with respect to the sourcing of imported
inputs with more productive (bigger) firms that are better equipped to directly source
in international market, whether firms in the middle range of productivity distribution
tend to acquire imported inputs through an intermediary. The results for both exports
and imports suggest a strong role for intermediaries which can contribute to open access
to foreign markets to a large proportion of small and less productive firms. Indeed, the
data reveals that, by allowing less efficient producers to export their products through
intermediaries, the number of firms who reach foreign markets increases by more than a
quarter. Whether the number of firms that can access to international sourcing of inputs
increases by more than half when companies can resort to intermediaries.
By looking at the source-country characteristics, the work investigates to what extent
the differences of direct and indirect traders with respect to non-traders are related to
economy-wide factors. Similarly to Davies and Jeppesen (forthcoming) we observe that
the higher the barriers to exports, the bigger the productivity gap between direct ex-
porters and non-exporters. The same regularity holds on the import side when country
barriers are measured with a proxy of the governance quality level. On the contrary, the
difference between indirect traders and non-traders seems not to be affected.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the recent theoretical
and empirical contributions considering intermediaries in international trade. Section 3
describes the survey data from BEEPS. Section 4 examines the characteristics of man-
ufacturers that do not trade, those that trade indirectly through an intermediary and
direct traders. Section 5 considers whether trade barriers lower the differences between
1As emphasized by Bernard et al. (2010b) there exist also firms that are engaged in a mix of those
activities.
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direct and indirect traders, both from the export and import side. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background literature
Recent models of international trade emphasize the role that heterogeneity in productivity
plays in explaining the structure of international commerce (Melitz; 2003; Roberts and Tybout;
1997). According to these models and a large quantity of associated empirical works, more
productive firms are more likely to engage in exporting and foreign direct investment
(Bernard et al.; 2007). These frameworks generally assume that trade occurs directly
between producers in one country and final consumers in another and do not account for
the possibility to export indirectly through an intermediary firm.
Only recently new models of trade, in particular Akerman (2010) and Ahn et al.
(2011), extend the heterogeneous firm trade model of Melitz (2003) by introducing an
intermediation technology which allows wholesalers to exploit economies of scope in ex-
porting.2 While the details of the models vary, the general framework is similar. Export-
ing directly incurs a fixed cost and a variable cost. Indirect exporting takes place through
an intermediary firm, or using intermediary ‘technology’. The intermediary is assumed to
be able to lower the fixed costs of exporting while possibly incurring additional variable
costs. The existence of the latter alternative means that a number of manufacturing firms
may export indirectly through a wholesaler, rather than managing their own distribu-
tion networks. These firms, indirect exporters, pay an intermediary fixed cost which is
smaller than their own fixed cost of direct exports. In this setting, firms choose to serve
the foreign market either directly or through domestically-based export intermediaries.
The decision concerning the mode of export depends on the relative productivity of
the firm. As in the standard model of Melitz (2003), the least productive firms serve only
the domestic market while the most productive firms can export directly by incurring the
fixed cost of export and any variable trade costs. A third category of firms chooses to
export indirectly through wholesalers. This third group, which looks like non-exporters
in the data, includes some firms who would not have been exporters in the absence
of intermediaries and some firms who would be marginal exporters in the absence of
intermediaries.
On an empirical side, contributions by Ahn et al. (2011), Akerman (2010), Bernard et al.
(forthcoming) and Bernard et al. (2010b) investigates several issues related to the activity
of intermediary exporters in China, Sweden, Italy and the US, respectively. The com-
mon finding of these studies is that intermediaries differ from direct exporters as they
are smaller in terms of total turnover and export value, but they export more products.
Other differences include the types of products exported and the destinations served.
Indeed, wholesalers are more likely to export to markets with higher destination-specific
fixed costs and focus on products that are less differentiated and have lower contract
intensity (Bernard et al.; forthcoming).
While these works mainly emphasize the differences in the attributes between direct
manufacturing exporters and intermediaries, due to data constraints they provide no in-
formation on the manufacturer which supplied the good to the intermediary in the first
place. Few recent works have started to investigate what drives the sorting of firms into
2Early theoretical work on the role of intermediaries in international trade, e.g Rauch and Watson
(2004) and more recently Petropoulou (2011), models international trade as an outcome of search and
networks.
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different mode of export. Abel-Koch (2013), using data from the World Bank Enterprise
Survey conducted in Turkey in 2005, shows that the share of indirect exports in total
exports declines significantly with a firm’s size, and this result is robust to the inclusion of
a variety of control variables and different estimation methods. Similarly, McCann (2013)
using the BEEPS survey for Eastern Europe shows that direct exporters are more pro-
ductive than both indirect exporters and domestic firms. Finally, Davies and Jeppesen
(forthcoming) confirm on a larger set of countries covered by BEEPS the existence of a
further productivity sorting for indirect exporters and they also investigate the interre-
lation between productivity sorting and source-specific country fixed costs of exporting.
While there is an emerging literature on the role of intermediaries on the export side,
empirical as well as theoretical work on the import side and on the characteristics of
firms that source inputs from abroad indirectly through wholesalers is much scarcer. The
only study available, Bernard et al. (2010b), suggests that intermediaries are important
not only for exports but also for imports. Using data for US, the paper shows that pure
importers wholesalers account for a large fraction of the population, 42%, and they have
a share of import value of 15%.
Who are such manufacturing firms that import indirectly through wholesalers? As
reminded, there are no available theoretical or empirical contributions on the different
sorting of firms into direct or indirect importing, notwithstanding the relevance of inter-
mediated imports. The existing evidence is limited to direct importers and it shows that
these firms display many of the features which identify direct exporters. Bernard et al.
(2009) focus on exporters and importers in the US and show that both are associated
with better performance. The evidence of higher productivity for importers with re-
spect to domestic firms is also detected in Muls and Pisu (2009); Altomonte and Bekes
(2009); Castellani et al. (2010); Halpern et al. (2011), among others. Theoretical models
have recognized that imports of intermediate and capital goods can raise productivity
via several channels: learning, variety and quality effects. It has also been suggested
that, as for exports, there is a self-selection mechanism that holds on the import side
(Castellani et al.; 2010). This is because importers need to invest in complementary as-
sets (or absorptive capacity) in order to effectively use imported inputs in their produc-
tion process and that this mechanism especially applies when importers purchase abroad
higher quality and/or more complex inputs compared to those domestically available.
Similarly, Kugler and Verhoogen (2009), assume that input quality and productivity are
complementary to obtaining higher-quality output, and that importing allows to choose
from a wider variety of inputs. Thus, more productive firms can be expected to look for
higher-quality inputs in international markets and they are more likely to self-select into
importing.
If the productivity sorting mechanism holds also for importers, we might expect that,
similarly to what observed for exports, the decision concerning the mode of import de-
pends on the relative productivity of the firm. With the possibility of importing through
intermediaries, firms now have an additional option of using the intermediation technol-
ogy to source from abroad. Therefore, we should observe an efficiency-ordering of firms
into import markets according to which domestic firms are less efficient than those using
an intermediary, while the latter are less efficient than firms which import directly. This
is because more capable firms produce higher quality outputs by using higher quality
and more expensive intermediate inputs.3 It follows that highly efficient firms importing
3Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) observe a positive relationship between plant size, input and output
prices using a representative sample of Colombian manufacturing firms. The assumption that marginal
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knowledge-intensive capital goods or very specific and high quality intermediate inputs
are more likely to do it directly, while firms sourcing abroad standardised low-price / qual-
ity inputs find it more profitable to do it indirectly through wholesalers. As in the export
case we can have two productivity cut-offs that indicate which ranges of productivity
determine exit, domestic purchase only, or direct imports.
Finally, the emerging literature on the existence of a variety of firms involved in
international trade has shown that country characteristics, and country level fixed costs
more in detail, are related to the level of firms’ exports and that such impact varies
across categories of exporters. In this respect, Ahn et al. (2011) show that exports by
intermediaries are less sensitive to country characteristics, such as distance and market
size, than exports by direct exporters. Focusing on a proxy for market level fixed costs,
Bernard et al. (forthcoming) find that intermediaries’ exports increase with market costs
in the destination market, suggesting that wholesalers are better able to spread fixed costs
across the different products they distribute in the destination market. Whether most
of these works consider the relationship between the export mode and the heterogeneity
in trade barriers of the destination countries, the recent work by of Davies and Jeppesen
(forthcoming) takes another perspective by investigating how productivity differences
across exporters vary with economy-wide factors of the source country. Using data for
several developing countries, their work suggests that a reduction in source-country trade
barriers increases the difference between indirect exporters and domestic-only firms while
reducing the gap between direct and indirect exporters. Our paper also contribute to this
stream of literature by analysing how the differences in the source-country specific costs
affect not only the export but also the import mode.
3 Data description
To investigate the choice between direct and indirect exporting and direct and indirect
importing, the paper employs data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Per-
formance Survey (BEEPS), a joint initiative of the European Bank of Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) and of the World Bank Group. The survey examines the quality
of the business environment for different regions by collecting firm-level data on a broad
range of issues including firm financing, labor, infrastructure, informal payments and
corruption, trade and innovation activities.4 Four rounds of the survey have so far been
implemented (1999, 2002, 2005 and 2009). The questionnaire administered by Enterprise
Surveys has evolved over time, hence not all variables are available in all waves. As a
result data are provided in two different formats: 1) the standardized one, where country
data are matched to a standard set of questions, and 2) country specific surveys, that offer
the complete survey information for a particular country. We chose the “Standardized
data 2002-2005” as it unifies the questions over a wide range of countries and it contains
more detailed information compared to the standardized dataset for the other period.
In particular, it contains the breakdown of input purchases into domestic, indirect and
direct import, which is crucial for our analysis. However, as a robustness check we also
run some of the regressions on the “Standardized data 2006-2011” and on the pooled
costs increase in output quality is also supported by the empirical results in Brambilla et al. (2012). These
authors find a positive relationship between the income level of destination countries, proxing consumers’
preference for high-quality goods, and the wages of workers employed by Argentinean exporters.
4All data are freely accessible to researchers at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
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data from 2002 to 2011.5
The “Standardized data 2002-2005” dataset originally includes 71,789 firms ranging
in all economic activities from 107 countries over the period 2002-2005. Once we focus
on firms in manufacturing industries and remove firms reporting missing values in the
variables of interest,6 we are left with 27,298 from 95 countries. The BEEPS database
contains information on a number of firm-level variables including number of employees,
total turnover, ownership structure, industry and geographical location. The empirical
analysis of this paper is mostly based on categorical variables whose values reflect inter-
viewees’ responses to survey questions. Table A1 in Appendix A reports the questions of
the BEEPS questionnaire with the coding of the possible answers that have been used to
construct the variables included in empirical models.
In order to check whether our results are driven by the over-representation of develop-
ing countries in the dataset we perform the empirical analysis separately on the subgroup
of advanced economies. Therefore, we select among the available countries those with per
capita income levels above the 75th percentile according to the World Bank.7 Countries
belonging to “High Income” groups are marked in Table 1 and 2 with ∗.
Besides cross-country comparability, one of the main advantage of the BEEPS data is
that total sales of producing firms are broken out in three mutually exclusive categories
(that sum to 100 percent): share of national sales, share of indirect exports and share
of direct exports. In the “Standardized data 2002-2005” dataset, but not in the later
waves, the same decomposition is also available for material inputs, so that the survey
reports the share of domestic purchases and the shares of indirectly and directly imported
material inputs.
Exploiting such decomposition of sales (purchase of inputs) we compute for each firm
the share of direct and indirect exports (imports). Figure 1 shows the distribution of direct
export (import) shares. The bimodality of the distribution is apparent and suggests a
dichotomy in the way firms get involved in international trade: either they only export
(import) directly or indirectly. Indeed, only 3.40% (5.05%) of exporters (importers) can
be classified as mixed direct-indirect.8
Given the properties of the distribution we proceed to create three mutually exclusive
dummy variables accounting for non-exporters, indirect exporters and direct exporters
(and the same on the import side).9 Table 1 and 2 report, respectively for exporters and
importers, the number of observations for each country broken down into domestic only
firms, indirect and direct exporters (importers). Across all countries, 65.4% of firms do
not export at all, 27.3% of firms export directly and 7.3% of firms reach foreign markets
using intermediaries.10 The ability to export indirectly increases by more than a quarter
the number of firms that can reach foreign markets with their goods. On the import side,
5Unfortunately, not all the analyses can be done on the pooled data as the information contained in
the two standardized datasets are not completely overlapping.
6The cleaning procedures are described in Appendix A, the Stata do file to replicate the analysis is
available upon request.
7This high-income group consists of Argentina, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Oman, Portugal,
Slovenia, Spain, and South Korea. GDP per capita, constant 2000 US$, downloaded from
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.
8We thank one anonymous referee for the suggestion to further investigate the distribution of the
shares of direct and indirect exports.
9The very few firms that are both direct and indirect exporters are assigned to the category direct
(indirect) if the share of direct exports is bigger (smaller) than the share of indirect exports. The same
procedure is applied to importers.
10The share of indirect exporters for High-Income is 5.5%.
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Table 1: Number of firms in BEEPS: domestic, direct, indirect exporters
Country Domestic Indirect Direct Country Domestic Indirect Direct
Only Exporter Exporter Only Exporter Exporter
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Albania 26 2 23 Latvia 13 2 15
Angola 68 1 Lebanon 28 17 45
Argentina* 95 4 33 Lesotho 9 2 14
Armenia 148 22 37 Lithuania 49 9 34
Bangladesh 554 54 366 Madagascar 146 13 64
Belarus 17 5 15 Malawi 106 10 33
Benin 108 5 21 Malaysia 29 5 19
Bolivia 37 4 6 Mali 51 1 11
Bosnia Herzegovina 21 3 20 Mauritania 18 2 4
Botswana 20 Mauritius 43 10 81
Brazil 1090 87 398 Mexico 651 20 15
Bulgaria 24 4 22 Moldova 143 6 76
Burkinafaso 25 2 8 Mongolia 122 18 27
Burundi 23 Morocco 332 48 457
Cambodia 1 8 18 Namibia 15 3
Cameroon 34 7 30 Nicaragua 419 65 68
Capeverde 24 1 Niger 8 7
Chile 518 51 266 Oman* 41 2 21
China 1163 176 141 Pakistan 628 17 113
Colombia 185 31 27 Panama 30 1 1
CostaRica 202 24 69 Paraguay 31 2 7
Croatia 21 4 29 Peru 37 9 14
Czech 36 9 31 Philippines 376 59 198
Dom.Republic 104 4 14 Poland 334 9 140
Ecuador 318 21 92 Portugal 55 14 46
Egypt 725 48 178 Romania 240 22 80
ElSalvador 333 62 165 Russia 71 4 21
Eritrea 6 Rwanda 10 1 2
Estonia 15 3 18 Senegal 64 2 50
Ethiopia 115 2 6 Serbia 78 26 87
Gambia 12 Slovakia 6 23
Georgia 14 15 Slovenia* 9 5 39
Germany* 109 7 93 SouthAfrica 209 58 275
Greece* 48 2 33 Spain* 63 2 46
Guatemala 342 36 135 SriLanka 117 125 157
Guinea 45 2 Swaziland 21 2 2
Guyana 98 7 46 Syria 98 20 46
Honduras 361 41 118 Tajikistan 132 3 16
Hungary 138 14 133 Tanzania 232 10 23
India 2612 140 505 Thailand 450 83 373
Ireland* 73 9 81 Turkey 360 152 456
Jamaica 23 4 19 Uganda 253 10 18
Jordan 160 13 163 Ukraine 99 8 35
Kazakhstan 216 3 32 Uruguay 20 1 3
Korea 103 17 77 Uzbekistan 128 2 29
Kyrgyzstan 102 9 39 Vietnam 579 142 408
Laos 143 17 81 Zambia 50 2 24
Total 17,858 1,988 7,452
High Income* 596 62 469
Note: Table reports the observations only for firms in the manufacturing sectors. High Income* includes
those countries above the 75th percentile of income level according to the World Bank. Mixed exporters
are those that export both directly and indirectly. Source: Our elaboration on BEEPS Standardized
data 2002-2005.
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Table 2: Number of firms in BEEPS: domestic purchaser, direct and indirect importers
Country Domestic Indirect Direct Country Domestic Indirect Direct
Purchaser Importer Importer Purchaser Importer Importer
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Albania 10 10 31 Latvia 12 9 9
Angola 69 Lebanon 14 28 48
Argentina* 132 Lesotho 1 17 7
Armenia 82 86 39 Lithuania 59 10 23
Bangladesh 377 94 503 Madagascar 89 48 86
Belarus 8 17 12 Malawi 28 26 95
Benin 66 29 39 Malaysia 53
Bolivia 47 Mali 17 23 23
Bosnia Herzegovina 14 12 18 Mauritania 24
Botswana 20 Mauritius 22 36 76
Brazil 887 487 201 Mexico 686
Bulgaria 12 22 16 Moldova 108 38 79
Burkinafaso 7 19 9 Mongolia 52 37 78
Burundi 23 Morocco 168 116 553
Cambodia 7 20 Namibia 18
Cameroon 11 27 33 Nicaragua 300 158 94
Capeverde 4 10 11 Niger 1 1 13
Chile 469 84 282 Oman* 14 8 42
China 1480 Pakistan 758
Colombia 243 Panama 32
CostaRica 151 48 96 Paraguay 40
Croatia 10 20 24 Peru 60
Czech 25 28 23 Philippines 292 88 253
Dom.Republic 75 10 37 Poland 223 200 60
Ecuador 177 80 174 Portugal 55 21 39
Egypt 648 79 224 Romania 157 102 83
ElSalvador 302 96 162 Russia 58 19 19
Eritrea 6 Rwanda 13
Estonia 13 8 15 Senegal 29 12 75
Ethiopia 123 Serbia 51 71 69
Gambia 12 Slovakia 1 8 20
Georgia 13 2 14 Slovenia* 8 8 37
Germany* 90 67 52 SouthAfrica 158 126 258
Greece* 32 27 24 Spain* 66 13 32
Guatemala 280 101 132 SriLanka 186 51 162
Guinea 47 Swaziland 25
Guyana 98 4 49 Syria 61 50 53
Honduras 318 57 145 Tajikistan 124 14 13
Hungary 98 55 132 Tanzania 198 19 48
India 3042 91 124 Thailand 906
Ireland* 37 56 70 Turkey 500 183 285
Jamaica 7 19 20 Uganda 251 14 16
Jordan 124 212 Ukraine 58 60 24
Kazakhstan 159 26 66 Uruguay 24
Korea 98 27 72 Uzbekistan 116 12 31
Kyrgyzstan 77 21 52 Vietnam 493 259 377
Laos 165 17 59 Zambia 11 7 58
Total 16,894 3,735 6,669
High Income* 532 227 368
Note: Table reports the observations only for firms in the manufacturing sectors. High Income* includes
those countries above the 75th percentile of income level according to the World Bank. Mixed exporters
are those that export both directly and indirectly. Source: Our elaboration on BEEPS Standardized
data 2002-2005.
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Figure 1: Percentage of direct exports (imports)
61.9% of firms do not import, 24.4% of firms import directly and 13.7% import indirectly.
Notice that on the import side the phenomenon is much more relevant as the possibility
to resort to international sourcing of inputs increases by more than half when firms can
resort to indirect imports.
The longitudinal component of the BEEPS dataset is insufficient to exploit time
variations. Indeed, repeated observations are available only for a sub-sample of firms.
Therefore, pooled estimation is the preferred technique in our empirical analysis where
we exploit the cross-sectional variation, within and across countries, in terms of firms’
performance and access to foreign markets. Nevertheless, firm-level controls are selected
in the BEEPS dataset to reduce the risk of bias arising from the omission of relevant
firm-level characteristics.
The main variables of the survey that we employ as proxy of firm size are total sales
and number of employees, and we use the ratio of the two as our proxy of labour pro-
ductivity. From the BEEPS dataset we obtain additional variables used in the empirical
analysis. The variable (log of) Age is included as a firm-level control to account for the
fact that younger firms are found to be less productive, smaller and less likely to get
access to foreign market. The analysis takes into account the legal structure of a firm
by including a dummy variable DFO that takes value one if the majority shareholder in
the company is a foreign firm. Indeed, foreign firms have greater opportunities to access
international markets and are, on average, bigger and more productive than domestically
owned ones. We also consider a proxy for the quality level of a firm, Dquality, which is
a dummy that takes value one if a firm has received an ISO certification. Finally, we
include the variable Dinnov that takes value one if a firm introduced new product lines,
upgraded existing ones or introduced new technology that has substantially changed the
way that the main product is produced in the last three years.
We are aware that, because of reverse causality problems, these controls are likely to
be endogenous with respect to the dependent variables. Therefore, we will not be able to
provide a causal interpretation to our results since the various mode of trading and the
firms’ performance might be jointly determined.
Firm-level trade data from the Enterprise survey are complemented with country
variables to investigate the extent to which the sorting of firms into direct or indirect
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trade is related to the characteristics of the country in which a firm is located. While
the empirical literature on intraindustry heterogeneity and trade usually discriminates
between firms based on where they export to or import from (Melitz and Ottaviano; 2008;
Eaton et al.; 2011; Bernard et al.; forthcoming; Serti et al.; 2010), the attention here is
on the relationship between source-specific trade costs and the differences across trading
statuses.11 Indeed, differences in institutional settings or the quality of the governance
across countries might be related to a higher (lower) propensity of firms to get involved
into international trade and, relatedly, also to the choice of the export or import mode.
To generate a proxy for the source-specific fixed costs we use information from three
measures provided by the World Bank Doing Business dataset (Djankov et al.; 2010).
Specifically, to measure how difficult is to export from a given country we use: the number
of documents required for exporting, the cost of exporting and the time needed to export.
Similarly, as a proxy of the barriers to import for a given country we use: the number of
documents required for importing, the cost of importing and the time needed to import.
Given the high level of correlation, on both the export and import side, between the
three variables, we use the primary factor derived from principal component analysis as
that factor accounts for most of the variance contained in the original indicators. We call
the source-specific market costs for exporting Market Costs Exp and the source-specific
market costs for importing Market Costs Imp.
To proxy for the institutional quality of the source country we use information from
the six variables in the World Bank’s Governance dataset (Kaufman et al.; 2009): Voice
and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. As these six
measures are highly correlated, we follow Bernard et al. (2010a) and use the primary
factor obtained from principal component analysis, Governance, as the proxy for country
governance quality.12 The activity of exporting or importing for firms located in countries
with better contracting environments is expected to be relatively easier and therefore to
require lower productivity than for firms based in countries with poor institutional quality.
4 Indirect Exporters and Importers
The aim of our empirical analysis is to examine the relationship between manufacturing
firm characteristics and their choice of import and export mode, direct or indirect. In
this respect we intend to examine one of the main predictions of recent theoretical trade
models contemplating the presence of intermediaries and the existence of a further pro-
ductivity sorting for firms that indirectly access to foreign markets. At the same time,
we also verify if the same sorting is at work also on the import side.13 In order to test
this hypothesis we perform a linear regression model, where the dependent variable is a
proxy of firm performance and the regressors are the different export or import mode.
This specification allows us to investigate how differences in firms’ performances are, on
average, related to increasing modes of involvement in international trade.
11Notice that the data at our disposal do not allow to decompose total exports (imports) across different
destinations (country of origin).
12Details on the construction of such variables to account for country level fixed costs are provided in
Bernard et al. (forthcoming).
13Producers might export indirectly through wholesale firms or through other manufacturing firms, so-
called “carry-along trade” (Bernard et al.; 2012). We cannot distinguish between these modes of indirect
export in the BEEPS data.
10
To study the productivity sorting between domestic firms, and different categories of
trading firms we estimate the following regression model
lnYf = c+ α1D
DirExp + α2D
IndExp + β1D
DirImp + β2D
IndImp + dct + ds + εf (1)
where Yf is the proxy for a firm’s efficiency measured by the (log) total sales per em-
ployee.14 DDirExp is a dummy which equals 1 if the manufacturer exports directly and
zero otherwise while DIndExp is a dummy which equals 1 if the manufacturer exports
indirectly and zero otherwise. Therefore, coefficients α1 and α2 capture how direct and
indirect exporters differ with respect to the baseline category of firms that report only
domestic sales. Similarly, we define as DDirImp the dummy for direct importers and
DIndImp the dummy for indirect importers. Hence the β1 and β2 coefficients represent the
percentage premia for firms importing directly or indirectly with respect to the baseline
category of non importing firms.
To account for heterogeneity in cross-sectional regressions we introduce country-year
fixed-effects in all specifications, dct. Moreover, industry fixed-effects (ds) are included to
allow for different production technologies across sectors. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level to allow for serial correlation of the error terms of a given firm across
years. However, given the fact that only for few firms we observe repeated observations,
we check the robustness of our results to alternative treatments of the error terms, such
as clustering by country, industry or country-industry-year level. Results, available upon
request, show that the use of alternative clustered standard errors does not affect the
significance of the coefficients on the variables of interest.
To directly compare the premium of direct with that of indirect traders, we propose
a different specification
lnYf = c + γ1D
DirExp + γ2D
X + σ1D
DirImp + σ2D
M + dct + ds + εf (2)
where the dependent variable is, as before, a proxy for a firm’s efficiency. As regressors
we include a dummy DX that equals 1 if a firm export either directly or indirectly and a
dummyDDirExp if a firm export but only directly. In this case, while γ2 tells us the average
effect of exports (either direct or indirect) on a firm’s productivity, the coefficient γ1
captures the difference in the productivity premia between direct and indirect exporters.
Similarly, for imports DM equals 1 if a firm imports, either directly or indirectly, and
DDirImp equals 1 if a firm imports but only directly.
The results for both specifications are reported in Table 3. We start our analysis by
including in the regression only the dummies for exporters (columns 1 and 4), those for
importers (columns 2 and 5) and then all the four dummies (columns 3 and 6). Column
(1) shows that both direct and indirect exporters reports higher sales per employee than
non-exporting firms. The relative magnitude of the coefficients also suggests that direct
exporters report a performance that is superior to that of indirect exporters. This is
confirmed by column (4) in which we directly test for the difference in the productivity
premia by estimating equation (2). Indeed, column (4) provides evidence that indirect
exporters report sales per employee that are 28.3% higher than non exporters and, in
turn, the labour productivity of direct exporters is, on average, 33.8% higher than that
of indirect exporters. The same sorting of firms that one observes on the export side, is
also found when looking at importing activities, column (2). Importers display higher
14We use sales because the data does not include measures of value-added.
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Table 3: Productivity sorting. Indirect exporters and importers, 2002-2005
Dep. Var. ln Labour Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DDirExp 0.541∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.031) (0.031)
DIndExp 0.249∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.029)
DDirImp 0.665∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
DIndImp 0.221∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.020)
DX 0.249∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.029)
DM 0.221∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.020)
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-squared 0.873 0.873 0.876 0.873 0.873 0.876
Observations 26,727 26,727 26,727 26,727 26,727 26,727
Note: Table reports regression of firms’ labour productivity on different dummies for direct and indirect
exporters and importers. DDirExp is a dummy for direct exporter and DIndExp is a dummy for indirect
exporter. Similarly, DDirImp is a dummy for direct importer and DIndImp is a dummy for indirect
importer. DX and DM is a dummy for exporter and importers, respectively. Baseline category is
domestic only. Robust standard errors clustered at firm-level are reported in parenthesis below the
coefficients. Asterisks denote significance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p< 10%). Source: Our
elaboration on BEEPS Standardized data 2002-2005.
sales per employee than non-importers, and also on the import side we find evidence of a
further productivity threshold that distinguishes indirect from direct importers, column
(5). On the import side, column (5), indirect importers are 24.7% more productive than
non importers, whether direct importers are 56% more productive than indirect ones.
The magnitude of the coefficients is not much affected when we consider, columns (3)
and (6), for the possibility that a firm might be both an importers and an exporters,
two-way traders in the following.
The results on the different sorting of firms in direct and indirect participation to
international trade remain valid even when restricting the sample to high income coun-
tries, columns (1) to (3) of Table 4, which has the effect of both dramatically reducing
the number of observations and of focusing on a set of countries with relevant differences
from developing countries, which represent the bulk of BEEPS.
As an additional robustness check we add to our baseline specifications of Table 3
further firm level controls such as the (log) age of a firm and three dummies accounting
respectively for the foreign ownership of a firm, DFO, the quality of a firm’s internal
processes, as proxied by ISO qualification, DQuality and a firm’s level innovation activity,
DInnov. Results are reported in columns (4) to (6) of Table 4. Again the variables of
interests, the dummies accounting for the different participation to trade, maintain the
expected sign and the statistical significance.
Appendix B contains further robustness checks. In particular, in Table 6 we consider
the relation between different export and import mode, and two proxies for firm size,
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Table 4: Productivity sorting. Indirect exporters and importers, 2002-2005. Robustness
Dep. Var. ln Labour Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HI HI HI All All All
DDirExp 0.398∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.088) (0.020) (0.021)
DIndExp 0.287∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.100) (0.032) (0.032)
DDirImp 0.408∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.105) (0.023) (0.024)
DIndImp 0.146∗ 0.073 0.181∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.080) (0.021) (0.021)
ln Age 0.011 0.011 0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
DFO 0.413∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
DQuality 0.348∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
DInnov 0.087∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-squared 0.117 0.110 0.121 0.857 0.857 0.859
Observations 1,114 1,114 1,114 20,818 20,818 20,818
Note: Table reports regression of firms’ labour productivity on different dummies for direct and indirect
exporters and importers. DDirExp is a dummy for direct exporter and DIndExp is a dummy for indirect
exporter. Similarly, DDirImp is a dummy for direct importer and DIndImp is a dummy for indirect
importer. Baseline category is domestic only. DFO is a dummy for the foreign ownership of the firm:
DQuality takes value one if a firm has received a ISO qualification; DInnov is a dummy for the level of
firm’s innovation. HI (High Income) includes those countries above the 75th percentile of the income level
according to the World Bank. Robust standard errors clustered at firm-level are reported in parenthesis
below the coefficients. Asterisks denote significance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p< 10%). Source:
Our elaboration on BEEPS Standardized data 2002-2005.
such as the number of employees and total sales, whether in Table 7 we consider the
more recent wave of the Enterprise survey 2006-2011, columns (1) to (3), and then we
pool both waves together, columns (4) to (6).15
Although, the cross-sectional nature of the analysis does not allow to establish causal-
ity, the results presented in this section are consistent with the initial hypothesis of firms’
productivity sorting into indirect and direct participation to international trade. In the
next section we test whether the productivity differences between direct and indirect
traders are related to the characteristics of the country where a firm is located, i.e. the
source-country.
15The BEEPS Standardized Data 2006-2011 does not contain the break down of input purchase in
domestic, indirect and directly imported. Hence it is possible to replicate only the analysis on the export
side.
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5 Source country trade costs and the mode of trade
The literature on the presence of different firms that are exporting has shown that country
characteristics display a different effect across the various categories of direct and indirect
traders (Ahn et al.; 2011; Bernard et al.; forthcoming). We take here a different perspec-
tive and, similarly to Davies and Jeppesen (forthcoming), we explore the relationship
between source-specific trade costs and the differences across trading statuses. Indeed,
it might be that the productivity sorting patterns detected in the previous section for
both exporters and importers varies with some source-specific variables. In particular, we
would expect that in those countries characterized by higher impediments to trade firms
have to be relatively more productive to reach foreign markets than firms located in re-
gions where trade is facilitated. This is because these firms, in addition to the ‘standard’
trade barriers, incur in other costs related, for instance, to the bad governance or to the
scarce infrastructure quality of the regions they are located in. To test this hypothesis
we estimate the following regression model
lnYf = c+ α1D
DirExp + α2D
IndExp + α3D
DirExp ∗ Zc + α4D
IndExp ∗ Zc+
+β1D
DirImp + β2D
IndImp + β3D
DirImp ∗ Zc + β4D
IndImp ∗ Zc + dct + ds + εf
(3)
where we propose a model similar to that of equation (1) but we add the interactions
term of the dummy variables for the trade status with Zc that are the two proxies for
source-specific costs described in Section 3. Specifically, Zc can be either the variable
Market Costs (for exports or imports) or the variable Governance. Therefore, the inter-
action DDirExp ∗ Zc captures whether the trade premia of direct exporters is stronger or
weaker in countries where it is relatively more difficult for firms to exports. Similarly,
DIndExp ∗Zc tells us to what extent the productivity premia of indirect exporters with re-
spect to non-traders varies across countries with different characteristics. Analogously, on
the import side, we consider the two interacted terms DDirImp∗Zc and D
IndImp∗Zc. Note
that in the specification of equation (3) the direct effect of source-country characteristics
is absorbed by the country-year specific fixed effect.
Results are reported in Table 5. Looking at coefficients in column (1) notice first that
the results regarding the productivity premia of direct and indirect exporters over non-
traders (α1 and α2) are robust to the inclusion of the interaction terms. The coefficient
α3 suggests that an increase in our measure of source-country specific costs of exporting
is associated to a larger productivity gap between direct exporters and domestic firms.
Therefore, the productivity premia of direct exporters is larger in those countries char-
acterized by higher impediments to exports. On the contrary, looking at the coefficient
α4, an increase in cost of exporting does not appear to exert any effect on the difference
between indirect exporters and non-exporters.16 Overall the results on the export side,
suggests that while an increase in source-country specific costs is associated to a wider
productivity gap between direct exporters and domestic firms, the increase in market cost
does not contribute to further enlarge the gap between indirect exporters and domestic
firms. This is an interesting result as it suggests that the ‘intermediation’ technology is,
to a certain extent, better able to cope with difficulties related to barriers to exports.
Indeed, higher source-country fixed costs of exporting do not imply a higher productivity
threshold for those firms resorting to an export intermediary.
16Notice that our results are roughly consistent with those of Davies and Jeppesen (forthcoming) even
if we consider a different wave of Enterprise Surveys.
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Table 5: Productivity sorting. Indirect exporters and importers, 2002-2005: the role of
trade costs
Dep. Var. ln Labour Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DDirExp 0.443∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021)
DIndExp 0.209∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033)
D
DirImp 0.514∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
D
IndImp 0.176∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
DDirExp* Market costs Exp 0.079∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.026)
DIndExp* Market costs Exp -0.004 0.003
(0.052) (0.053)
DDirImp* Market costs Imp -0.025 -0.036
(0.024) (0.027)
DIndImp* Market costs Imp -0.026 -0.021
(0.029) (0.029)
DDirExp* Governance -0.100∗∗∗ -0.055∗
(0.027) (0.031)
DIndExp* Governance 0.013 0.005
(0.059) (0.060)
DDirImp* Governance -0.145∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.036)
DIndImp* Governance -0.031 -0.046
(0.030) (0.031)
ln Age 0.009 0.010 -0.001 0.010 0.011 0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
D
FO 0.414∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
D
Quality 0.358∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
DInnov 0.084∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-squared 0.859 0.859 0.861 0.859 0.859 0.861
Observations 20,458 20,458 20,458 20,458 20,458 20,458
Note: Table reports regression of firms’ labour productivity on different dummies for direct and indirect
exporters and importers. DDirExp is a dummy for direct exporter and DIndExp is a dummy for indirect
exporter. Similarly, DDirImp is a dummy for direct importer and DIndImp is a dummy for indirect
importer. Baseline category is domestic only. Market costs and Governance are two different proxy for
trade costs. DFO is a dummy for the foreign ownership of the firm: DQuality takes value one if a firm has
received a ISO qualification; DInnov is a dummy for the level of firm’s innovation. Robust standard errors
clustered at firm-level are reported in parenthesis below the coefficients. Asterisks denote significance
levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p< 10%). Source: Our elaboration on BEEPS Standardized data
2002-2005.
When looking at the import side, column (2), both interactions terms β3 and β4 seem
to indicate that the market fixed costs for importing do not affect the differences in
productivities for the categories of firms under analysis. This suggests that while there
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exists a similar efficiency sorting of firms into direct and indirect export (import) there
might exist differences in how the various modes of trade respond to varying source-
specific costs of exporting (importing). Finally, column (3) shows that results still hold
when including both export and import dummies and the relative interactions.
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 5 consider a different source-specific variable, Governance,
capturing the level of institutional quality of the country. This variable takes into account
a broader set of country characteristics than the previous one as it includes data on
the governance, the political stability or the control of corruption. While the previous
variable focuses on the impediments related to trade, this indicator contains a large set of
information regarding the contracting environment. Coherently with the analysis on the
cost indicator, as governance improves, the difference between direct exporters and non
exporters declines, whether the difference between indirect exporters and non exporters
is not affected. Column (5) shows that when looking at the governance indicator as
a proxy for market fixed costs, one finds an analogous effect of the interacted dummy
also on the import side: a higher quality of governance corresponds to a smaller gap in
productivity between direct importers and non-importers. In column (6) we include both
export and import dummies and their interactions and the coefficients maintain their
sign and significance levels.
Overall the results of Table 5 suggest that while on the export side both higher costs
for exporting and lower governance quality increase the productivity difference between
direct exporters and non-exporters, on the import side only a lower governance quality
affects the gap. More interesting, for both exports and imports, source-country fixed
costs do not seem to change the productivity gap between indirect traders and domestic
firms. This result might be due to the fact that wholesalers are better able to cope with
difficulties related to barriers to exports. Such explanation is consistent with previous
empirical analyses showing that wholesalers are more likely to export to more ‘difficult’
markets, characterized by higher fixed costs of entry (Ahn et al.; 2011; Bernard et al.;
forthcoming). Due to the characteristics of the ‘intermediation technology’, even when
exports costs increases the productivity level required to export or import indirectly does
not change.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the emerging literature on the relative importance of the differ-
ent modes of access to foreign markets. Recent theoretical models of international trade
with intermediaries show that heterogeneity in productivity plays an important role in
explaining the different mode of export entry. These models predict an efficiency-ordering
of firms into three categories: non-exporters, indirect and direct exporters. Indeed, the
most productive firms export directly to foreign countries, followed by firms in the middle
range of the productivity distribution that export indirectly through intermediaries, and
finally by the least efficient firms that serve the domestic country only.
We use information for 27,298 firms from 95 countries for the period between 2002-
2005 to provide empirical support for this prediction. We confirm previous findings and
show that firms which export directly perform better than those using an intermediary
firms. While the existing studies focus on the mode of exports, there are no available
theoretical or empirical contributions on the different sorting of firms into direct or in-
direct importing, notwithstanding the relevance of intermediated imports. We fill this
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gap by providing the first evidence on productivity sorting both for direct and indirect
importers. In principle, the efficiency sorting model detected for exporters should hold
also on the import side. Indeed, because most productive firms purchase abroad higher
quality and/or more complex inputs they are more likely to do it directly rather than
resorting to an import intermediary. The analysis of the import side also reveals that
the phenomenon of indirect trade is much more relevant on the import as compared to
the export side. Exporting firms increase by a quarter when allowing for indirect export,
whether accounting for indirect importing reveals that the number of firms resorting to
international sourcing of inputs increase by 50%.
Finally, we investigate whether trade barriers lower the differences between direct and
indirect traders, again both from the export and import side. We confirm the previous
findings of Davies and Jeppesen (forthcoming) concerning the productivity gap between
direct exporters and non-exporting firms. We extend the previous analysis by showing
that the same effect holds also when looking at direct importers and domestic purchasers.
However, the average difference between indirect traders and non-traders does not appear
to change with the country characteristics, neither on the export nor on the import side.
The latter result suggests that intermediaries are better able to cope with barriers to
trade.
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Appendix
Appendix A - Variables description and data cleaning
The empirical analysis was performed employing the dataset “Standardized data 2002-
2005” which was downloaded from www.enterprisesurveys.org. Although a more re-
cent dataset is available, covering the period 2006-14, it does not contain the breakdown
for the purchase of material inputs into domestic, indirectly, and directly imported. The
dataset originally contains 71,789 observations from 151 countries.17 Once we focus on
firms in the manufacturing sectors we are left with 45,137 observations from 102 countries.
Removing firms without information on the breakdown of sales (purchase of inputs) drops
1,096 (10,985) observations. We also drop more than 5,000 observations not reporting
either sales or employment. At this stage we are left with 27,298 observation from 95
countries, which is the total number of observation reported in Tables 1 and 2. In order
to get rid of outliers which might bias the results we set as missing observations reporting
with productivity, employment and sales figures smaller than the first and bigger that
the 99th percentile on a year-country basis (some countries are surveyed in more than
one years). Davies and Jeppesen (forthcoming) also resort to a question of the 2006-14
BEEPS dataset about the quality of the responses to the survey. The wave of the survey
that we employ (2002-05) does not contain such question.
17Stata do files with the cleaning procedures and regressions are available upon request.
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Table A1: Variables description
Variable Wording of survey questions and answers’ codes
Exporting
QUESTION: What percent of your establishment’s sales are:
i) sold domestically
ii) exported directly
iii) exported indirectly (through a distributor)
Importing
QUESTION: What percent of your establishment’s material inputs and supplies are:
i) purchased from domestic sources
ii) imported directly
iii) imported indirectly (through a distributor)
Age
QUESTION: In what year did your firm begin operations in this country?
Foreign Ownership
QUESTION: Which of the following best describes the largest shareholder or owner in your firm?
1)Individual
2)Family
3)Domestic company
4)Foreign company
5)Bank
6)Investment fund
7)Managers of the firm
8)Employees of the firm
9)Government or government agency
10) Other (Specify)
Quality
QUESTION: Has your firm received ISO (e.g. 9000, 9002 or 14,000) certification?
Yes=1 ; No=2
Innovation
QUESTION: Has your company undertaken any of the following initiatives in the last three years?
1) Developed a major new product line: Yes=1 ; No=2
2) Upgraded an existing product line: Yes=1 ; No=2
3) Introduced new technology that has substantially changed
the way that the main product is produced: Yes=1 ; No=2
Note: The table reports the questions in the BEEPS survey used to construct the variable used in the
empirical analysis.
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Appendix B - Robustness checks
Table 6: Employment and Sales. Indirect exporters and importers, 2002-2005.
Dep. Var. ln Employment ln Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DDirExp 1.316∗∗∗ 1.033∗∗∗ 1.857∗∗∗ 1.423∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.026)
DIndExp 0.654∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.030) (0.043) (0.040)
D
DirImp 1.362∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗ 2.028∗∗∗ 1.442∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.031)
D
IndImp 0.411∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.023) (0.034) (0.031)
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-squared 0.386 0.356 0.427 0.788 0.782 0.805
Observations 26,826 26,826 26,826 26,733 26,733 26,733
Countries 99 99 99 99 99 99
Note: Table reports regression of firms’ characteristics on different dummies for direct and indirect
exporters and importers. DDirExp is a dummy for direct exporter and DIndExp is a dummy for indirect
exporter. Similarly, DDirImp is a dummy for direct importer and DIndImp is a dummy for indirect
importer. Baseline category is domestic only. Robust standard errors clustered at firm-level are reported
in parenthesis below the coefficients. Asterisks denote significance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p<
10%). Source: Our elaboration on BEEPS Standardized data 2002-2005.
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Table 7: Productivity sorting. Indirect exporters, 2002-2011
Dep. Var. ln LP ln Empl ln Sales ln LP ln Empl ln Sales
Standardized data 2006-2011 Pooled data 2002-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DDirExp 0.663∗∗∗ 1.489∗∗∗ 2.152∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 1.464∗∗∗ 2.086∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.026) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019)
DIndExp 0.323∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗ 1.154∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 1.066∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.039) (0.022) (0.020) (0.031)
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-squared 0.808 0.314 0.685 0.824 0.353 0.771
Observations 34,533 34,533 34,533 71,489 71,489 71,489
Countries 118 118 118 150 150 150
Note: Table reports regression of firms’ characteristics on DDirExp, a dummy for direct exporter and
DIndExp, a dummy for indirect exporter. Baseline category is domestic only. Robust standard errors
clustered at firm-level are reported in parenthesis below the coefficients. Asterisks denote significance
levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p< 10%). Our elaboration on BEEPS Standardized data 2006-20011
and Pooled data 2002-2011.
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